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COMMENTS
POWER OF LEGISLATIVE BODIES TO PUNISH FOR
CONTEMPT.
Does a legislative body in the United States have the power
to punish for contempt both its own members and outsiders as
a means of carrying out its legitimate legislative functions: (1)
of keeping order among its own members and compelling their
attendance and of protecting them from the assaults or dis-
turbances of others who (a) physically obstruct its proceedings,
or (b) slander or libel the assembly or its members; (2) of dis-
charging such judicial-like functions as the determination of
election cases and impeachment charges: (3) of seeking in-
formation deemed necessary for the enactment of laws or the
voting of supplies; and (4) of educating the voters or bring-
ing to bear upon administration the force of enlightened public
opinion?
Under the English legislative practice, sustained by the courts
of Westminster Hall, the House of Commons, by its contempt
powers, has protected its members-and at one time their serv-
ants and tenants-from arrest on civil process during the ses-
sions of Parliament and for a reasonable time before and after
the session, and from assaults, affronts, insults, and libels, and
has protected itself against publications reflecting upon its dig-
nity, and since 1689 has controlled elections and investigated
other departments of government and matters of general con-
cern.'
In Kilbouim v. Thompson,2 the United States Supreme Court
took the position that the English legislative practice was not a
precedent for the United States because the contempt power of
the House of Commons is not an inherent legislative power but a
judicial power derived from the days when it sat with the other
house as one body as the High Court of Parliament. This posi-
tion was clearly wrong because either the House of Commons
is not a law court,3 or if it is a law court it is such a court to no
greater extent than United States legislative bodies. It is essen-
tially a legislative body, and its practice has persuasive value
IBarnardiston v. Soame (1689), 6 State Trials 1119, 74 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. 700-708.
2 (1880) 103 U. S. 168.
3 Jones v. Randall (1774) 1 Cowp. 17.
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in this country. The powers of the House of Commons in this
respect are only a part of our Anglo-American heritage.
In America, the colonial assemblies followed the example of
the mother country, and punished as for contempt people who
detained, or assaulted, or affronted members or members-elect,
or libelled the assemblies themselves, and exercised the contempt
powers in the control of elections, and in connection with the in-
vestigations of other departments of government. 4
Nine of the eleven states which adopted constitutions during
the Revolution made no mention of the power of punishment for
contempt, but the statesmen of the Period were familiar with
colonial precedents and regarded the power to punish for con-
tempt as an auxiliary of the legislative power and therefore not
necessary to be mentioned, and the state legislatures in Virginia,
Pennsylvania, and New York acted upon this theory in a num-
ber of instances.5
The Constitution of the United States is silent upon the sub-
ject of punishment for contempt except as it gives each house
power to "punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with
the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member," but Congress has
in numerous instances acted upon the theory that it has such
an auxilliary power. In 1795 the House punished for contempt
Robert Randall for offering a bribe. In 1800 the Senate pun-
ished for contempt William Duane for refusal to appear to an-
swer a libel charge. In 1812 the House punished for contempt
N. Rounsavell for refusal to testify. In 1818 the House pun-
ished for contempt John Anderson for bribery. In 1809 the
House punished for contempt J. A. Coles for an assault on a
member. In 1828 the House punished for contempt one Jarvis
for an assault on the President's private secretary sent as a
messenger. In 1832 the House punished for contempt Sam.
Houston, a former governor of Tennessee, for an assault. In
1792 the House investigated the St. Clair Expedition. In 1859
the Senate investigated the Raid of John Brown and punished
T. Hyatt for contempt for refusal to attend.6 A great variety
of other investigations have been ordered by one or the other
house.7
There have been many decisions of the state courts recogniz-
ing the legislative practice so far as concerns the legislature's
4 74 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 701-703, 704-706, 707-708, 708-712.
5 74 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 712-719.
6 74 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 719-725; McGrain v. Dam'gherty, 47 S. Ct. 319.
7 38 Harv. L. Rev. 234, 237, n. 28. See also: 1 Stat. 554, c. 36; 11 Stat.
155, c. 19; 3 Stat. 345, c. 10; 12 Stat. 333.
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protevtive or defensive function,8 the legislature's judicial func-
tion,9 and the legislature's law-making function.10
Prior to 1927 there were four decisions of the United States
Supreme Court upon the question of the contempt powers of
Congress.
The first decision was that of Anderson v. Dunn."- In this
case Dunn, sergeant at arms, brought Anderson before the
House and kept him in attendance until he was heard in his de-
fense and was finally reprimanded for attempting to bribe a
member. He acted pursuant to a warrant of the speaker of the
House under authority of a resolution of the House. Anderson
later sued Dunn in trespass for assault and battery and im-
prisonment. The Supreme Court held that Dunn was not guilty
because protected by the authority of the House, and said that
the power to punish for contempt was a legislative as well as a
judicial power, but not an executive power.
The next decision was that of Kilbourn v. ThoMtpson. 12 In
this case the sergeant-at-arms of the House was held liable for
the imprisonment of the plaintiff for refusal to testify before
the House, although he acted under an order of the House, on
the ground that the House had exceeded its powers in directing
the investigation, but the investigation related to the private
affairs of a real estate partnership where the United States
was a mere creditor of one of the parties concerned and the in-
vestigation was clearly judicial in nature. However, the court
held that punishment for contempt was a judicial power, and
that the House could punish for contempt (1) only its own mem-
bers when guilty of disorderly conduct or failure to attend, and
its own members or others in (2) contested elections, and (3)
impeachment cases.
The next case was In re Chapman.13 Chapman on subpoena
appeared before a committee, and was asked whether or not
his firm of stockbrokers had bought or sold stock or securities
s Ex parte McCarthy (1866), 29 Cal. 395, 403; Canfield v. Gresham
(1891), 82 Tex. 10; Sullivan v. Bill (1913), 73 W. Va. 49; In re Falvey
(1858), 7 Wis. 630, 636. The leading English case upholding the power of
the House of Commons to imprison for the publication of a libel upon it is
Burdett v. Abbott (1811), 14 East 1, 137-8.
9 Ex parte Dalton (1886), 44 Oh. 142, and cases supra note 8.
lo Burnham v. Morrissey (1859), 14 Gray 226, 238; McDonald v. Keeler
(1885), 99 N. Y. 463; Ex parte Parker (1906), 74 S. C. 466; State v.
Frear (1909), 138 Wis. 173.
11 (1821) 6 Wheat. 204.
12 (1880) 103 U. S. 168.
13 (1896) 166 U.,S. 661.
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in the American Sugar Refining Co. for United States senators,
but he refused to answer. He was then indicted and convicted
under an act of 1857 making contempt a misdemeanor and was
imprisoned. He then sued out a writ of habeas corpus. The
Supreme Court held that the Senate could compel witnesses to
appear and testify in connection with its protective and de-
fensive function and that it could make the contempt a misde-
meanor.
The latest case was Marshall v. Gordon.14 In this case a
United States attorney for the Southern District of New York,
while a committee of the House was investigating him with a
view to impeachment, published a letter which the House called
defamatory and for which he was arrested. He sued out a writ
of habeas corpus and the Supreme Court held that it would lie
on the ground that the House had the power to punish for con-
tempt only to preserve a legislative power granted and then
could imprison only during the session, and apparently that it
did not have the power to punish as for contempt, slander or
libel of the House or its members.
Thus the Supreme Court prior to 1927 had upheld the con-
tempt powers of Congress so far as they related to keeping or-
der among its own members, compelling their attendance, and
protecting them from the assaults or disturbances of others by
physical means, although apparently not if by slander or libel,
and so far as they related to the discharge of such judicial-like
functions as the determination of election cases and impeach-
ment charges. It had not upheld such powers so far as they re-
lated to the law-making function nor the informative function,
but many state courts had upheld the power so far as it related
to the law-making function,15 and it had been upheld so far as
concerned the informative function by one lower federal court
and Supreme Court dicta;1 and there had been legislative prac-
tice-English, colonial, state and federal-justifying the use of
the contempt powers for all the legislative functions named. 17
In the light of all these precedents what answer should have
been given between 1924 and 1926 to the question with which
this Comment started? It would seem as though an affirmative
answer should have been given to every part of the question.
But many important men in the United States, who found it to
14 (1917) 243 U. S. 521.
15 Note 10 supra.
1, Ex parte Caldwell (1905), 138 Fed. 487; In re Chapman, 166 U. S.
661, 794.
17 Notes 1-7 supra.
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their own interest to think otherwise, maintained that Congress
had no such powers, and by their refusal to testify before inves-
tigating committees gave us the spectacle of a few men having
more power to conceal than the entire government had to dis-
cover. In particular in 1924 the proceedings of the Committee
of the Senate appointed to investigate the management of the
Department of Justice were brought to a standstill by the re-
fusal of Mally S. Daugherty, the brother of the attorney general,
to appear before the Committee and to produce the books of a
bank of which he was president.
Mally S. Daugherty was arrested by the sergeant-at-arms of
the Senate for the purpose of compelling his attendance, but he
was discharged on habeas corpus proceedings by a district judge
of the United States for the Southern District of Ohio,18 on the
authority of the Kilbourn case, so that the desired information
was not obtained; but the case was appealed to the United States
Supreme Court, and in January, 1927, in the case of McGrain
v. Daugherty,19 the Supreme Court held that the District Court
of Ohio had erred in discharging Daugherty from custody and
reversed the order of such court, because it held that Congress
possesses such auxiliary powers as are necessary and appro-
priate to make the express powers effective; that, although it
does not possess any general power to inquire into private affairs
and to compel disclosures, it does possess the power to exact in-
formation in aid of the legislative function with process to
enforce it as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legis-
lative function; that the investigation in question was for such a
purpose and not for the purpose of trying the Attorney General
before its bar, although the resolution directing the investigation
did not expressly so say, and that the question had not become
moot by the expiration of the 68th Congress because the Senate
is a continuing body.
The Supreme Court based its decision upon legislative prac-
tice in the British Parliament, colonial legislatures, state legis-
latures, and by both houses of Congress (although it discussed
only the latter) ; upon the decisions of the state courts cited
above; and upon the four decisions of the United States Supreme
Court just discussed. The decision is clearly correct both from
the standpoint of authority and from the standpoint of prin-
ciple, and now gives the answer of the Supreme Court to another
part of our question.
The court rested its decision upon the power of legislative
18 Ex parte Daugherty (1924), 229 Fed. 620.
19 (1927) 47 S. Ct. 319.
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bodies to punish for contempt in aid of the law making func-
tion. That is, the Senate had the power to carry on an inves-
tigation as a basis for legislation. It might also have rested its
decision upon the power of the Senate to investigate the ad-
ministration of one of the departments of government, and upon
its power to inform the voters and public generally as to how
their business is being conducted.20
The power is neither a survival of the judicial power when
both houses of England sat together as a highest court, nor a
power conferred, but an inherent power of legislative bodies.
Its basis is necessity.2  It is not, therefore, affected by the doc-
trine of separation of powers, which is a political rather than a
legal doctrine, but because thereof an assembly cannot afflict
punishment as punishment but only for the purpose of removing
an obstruction to its proceedings. As a result of this decision
Congressional investigations will doubtless begin again, and men
will either testify when asked to do so, or go to jail.
HUGH EVANDER WILLIS.
Indiana University School of Law.
uo 74 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 691-725, 780-829; 34 Yale L. J. 326; 40 Harv. 153.
21 Burdett v. Abbott (1811), 14 East. 1, 137-8; Anderson v. Dunn
(1821), 6 Wheat. 204. Kilbourn v. Thompson was wrong in this respect,
and to that extent should no longer be regarded as authority.
